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Abstract
Jury researchers have long been concerned about the generalizability of results from
experiments that utilize undergraduate students as mock jurors. The current experiment examined the differences between 120 students (55 males and 65 females,
mean age = 20 years) and 99 community members (49 males and 50 females, mean
age = 42 years) in culpability evaluations for homicide and sexual assault cases. Explicit attitude measures served as indicators of bias for sexual assault, defendant,
and homicide adjudication. Results revealed that student and community participants showed different biases on these general explicit attitude measures and these
differences manifested in judgments of culpability (guilt likelihood, convincingness
of state’s arguments, convincingness of defendant’s arguments, and the defendants’
criminal intentions) in sexual assault and homicide case scenarios. The results also
showed that student mock jurors were more lenient when assigning guilt in homicide cases than were community members. The implications for future mock jury
research are discussed.
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Introduction
Graduate students, and indeed undergraduate psychology majors,
spend a great deal of time learning about the differences between
drawing causal inferences from research data and generalizing those
inferences outside the sample data that produced them (Cook & Campbell, 1979). For jury researchers, the issue of generalizability goes beyond the usual concerns of time, locations, and research participants
to include creating an accurate representation of the processes in the
laboratory that we observe in the courtroom. To the extent that researchers are successful at modeling the factors that define jury decision-making at trial in their laboratories, the results of the research
will be informative to the legal system. To the extent that they are not
successful, the results will be less relevant to the law but may still be
important to scholars as they try to develop theories of choice that
capture the decision-making in culpability evaluations. The factors
that researchers typically try to represent in the laboratory include,
but are not limited to, elements of the law, trial procedures, rules of
evidence, and the impact of trial outcomes on the judgments and decisions of lay jurors.
It seems to us that in jury research, the issues of external validity
(generalizing across people, locations, and times) and construct validity (generalizing from laboratory processes to real jury rooms) are
heavily interactive. In other words, the effectiveness of legal translation and trial simulations is very likely dependent upon the knowledge, background, and understanding of the individuals who serve as
research participants, or mock jurors, in our analog studies. When researchers ask jurors to make civil liability decisions or criminal culpability decisions, the decision changes not only with the jury instructions, quality of the jury simulation, elements of the law, admissibility
of evidence, and the like, but also with the nature of the decisionmaker. Therefore, the central question at issue is the interaction between the measures and manipulations, on the one hand, and the type
of decision-maker reaching decisions on the other.
We are hardly the first jury researchers to consider the interaction
of people with measures and manipulations. At the same time that
Cook and Campbell (1979) were writing their seminal paper elaborating on their approach to understanding different types of validities,
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Weiten and Diamond (1979) were applying these same ideas to jury
research. Weiten and Diamond (1979) surveyed the then existing simulated jury research and identified six threats to external validity (i.e.,
the ability of a research design to make valid causal inferences) and
policy relevance. These included (not in their original order) inadequate trial simulations, lack of jury deliberations, inappropriate dependent variables (focusing too often on criminal punishment and
lacking actual elements of charged crimes), corroboration with field
research (i.e., convergence of findings between laboratory and field
studies), problems in role-playing (i.e., the difference in consequences
of decisions for real and mock jurors are substantial), and inadequate
sampling (relying too heavily on college student mock jurors). While
the first five of these categories are problems for construct validity,
the last is clearly an issue of what we more traditionally refer to as external validity (i.e., the ability of a research design to generalize across
people, locations, and times; Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Furthermore, when discussing the issues inherent in inadequate
sampling, these authors consistently entertained the likelihood that
‘‘interactions between experimental treatments and subject variables
may pose threats to valid cross-sample inference’’ (p. 76). For example, Weiten and Diamond (1979) considered an early study in which
Berg and Vidmar (1975) showed that conservatism correlated positively with harsh jury decision-making and argued that student mock
jurors may be less conservative, less authoritarian and therefore more
likely to be lenient in criminal trials. Another way of thinking about
this problem is that juror attitudes interact with case facts, charges,
and trial procedure in such a way as to threaten the construct validity of the studies that rely solely on undergraduate mock jurors. Put
bluntly, the question is simply this: do undergraduates come with attitudes and beliefs that alter their perceptions of legal constructs, such
as the meaning of the elements of crime or a tort, beyond a reasonable
doubt versus preponderance of the evidence, criminal intent, negligence, burden of proof, and the like? If so, then the interaction of type
of participant and type of procedure may indeed become a subtle but
important threat to the generalizability of mock jury research. Weiten
and Diamond (1979) go on to suggest that other factors, such as differences in cognitive capacities, might make student jurors behave differently than jury-eligible citizens. If students have greater memory
capacities and information-processing abilities than do typical jurors,
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then they may reach very different judgments about the same case
facts, or even if they reach similar judgments, they may do so using
very different approaches, styles, and information. Indeed, in an independent assessment of the simulated jury research, Bray and Kerr
(1979) shared Weiten and Diamond’s concerns and called for researchers to systematically explore how well simulated research studies generalize to real trial results. Some, but not all, argue that this work is
still lacking in the literature.
Eighteen years later, Diamond (1997) revisited her arguments about
the threats that mock jury research present to external validity and
policy relevancy and concluded that some progress was evident in the
literature. Her review showed more studies with realistic measures,
legally relevant trial simulations, and even more use of jury-eligible
mock jurors. Still she found room for improvement, grounded, again,
in concerns about the interactions between participant attributes and
legal processes. She opined that there were mixed results in the literature comparing student samples with eligible jurors, with some
showing parallel findings (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989) but others
finding major differences between the samples (Severance, Greene,
& Loftus, 1984). The problem in 1997 remained the interaction between external and construct validity. According to Diamond (1997),
we had no theories to help us understand when and how differences
between student and general adult populations interacted with the
experimental manipulations that researchers used to try to capture
the jury experience in a simulated mock jury study. Diamond (1997)
called for efforts at building a database to compare the differences between student and adult samples and to develop theories that guided
researcher discretion about sampling. Our work in this paper and elsewhere studying generic prejudice (Wiener, Arnot, Winter, & Redmond,
2006) goes to those twin goals of developing a theory that offers an
adequate model of jury behavior and that points the way to tests of
the main effects and interactions of participant attributes in the context of legally relevant judgments and decisions. Diamond (1997) concluded that, ‘‘… until we can predict reliably when a student sample
is likely to provide an adequate model of juror behavior, jury venires
should remain the preferred source for maximizing both face and external validity’’ (p. 563).
Shortly after Diamond revisited this issue, Bornstein (1999) also
addressed the concerns of external and construct validity in mock jury

K e l l e r & W e i n e r i n B e h av i o r a l S c i e n c e s a n d t h e L aw 2 9 ( 2 0 1 1 )

5

research. Bornstein took seriously the need for an empirical assessment of the relationship between student and jury-eligible citizens’
performance in mock jury trials. He collected and displayed a table of
26 experiments, which included student and non-student samples, and
tabulated how many studies found main effects comparing student
and non-student samples and how many found interactions. While this
analysis does not constitute a true meta-analysis with an exhaustive
list of studies, measures of effect sizes and fail-safe statistics, Bornstein found only six out of the 26 reported main effects for type of
participant and even fewer that found interactions with other study
factors. He suggested that jury researchers could take solace from the
findings that type of participant does not seem to matter a great deal
in mock jury research. Indeed, many articles published after 1999 cite
this paper to justify the use of convenient but less than realistic simulations and undergraduate participants in mock jury research.
While we welcome the Bornstein (1999) analysis as a first step in
examining systematically what we know about student mock jurors
and community samples, we must point out that it does not address
several important factors. This initial work was unable to examine the
specific types of interactions involving sample type and the factors
that define specific construct validity issues in jury research (burdens
of proof, standards of evidence, deliberations, types of charges, and
the like). For example, at even the most elementary level, we wonder
whether type of charge matters, and we suspect that it does. Very little, if any, data directly compare differences in how student and community jurors think about facts and evidence even for criminal cases
with a common theme, such as violent crime.
Despite researchers’ hopes that juror type has minimal consequence, there are, as of yet, no formal meta-analyses that we know
of that tested differences in samples or interactions between samples
and other study factors in mock jury research, with the exception of
Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, and Meissner (2005), who examined race effects in mock jury research. The authors studied both jury verdicts and
sentencing and found small effects for racial bias more among Black
than among White research participants. For our purposes, the most
interesting finding in the study was that the type of participant moderated the effect of the race of the defendant, so that community members were more likely to show racial bias in sentencing (but not verdict decisions). Thus for at least some purposes there is some formal
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evidence that type of juror does modify judgments about defendants.
Where else will we find evidence of interactions between external and
construct validity factors?
Much more needs to be done. One of the most important findings in
the Mitchell et al. (2005) study was the difficulty that the researchers
had in studying the moderating effects of type of sample. For the verdict decision, the authors located 37 experiments that studied the effects of race in student samples, but only seven that did so with community samples. For the sentencing decision there were 15 student
sample studies but only five community sample studies. In short, the
Mitchell et al. (2005) meta-analysis suggests that the interaction between defendant race and type of sample is worth further investigation, but that until more community studies appear in the literature,
formal comparisons using meta-analytic techniques to study this and
other interactions between external and construct validity threats will
remain difficult to complete.
In this paper, we try to further this type of work by asking whether
student and community samples think differently about sexual assault
charges and homicide charges. In our previous work, we conducted a
number of community sample studies looking at legal decision-making
involving sexual harassment (Maeder & Wiener, 2007; Wiener &Winter, 2007; Wiener & Hurt, 1999, 2000; Wiener, Hurt, Russell, Mannen, & Gasper, 1997; Wiener Hackney, Kadela, Rauch, Seib, Warren,
& Hurt, 2002; Wiener, Voss, Winter, & Arnot, 2005), jury decisions in
re-enacted death penalty cases (Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995;
Wiener, Rogers, Winter, Hurt, Hackney, Kadela, Seib, Rauch, Warren,
& Morasco, 2004; Wiener, Richter, Humke, Jones, Maeder, & Cantone,
unpublished), and with this current paper, generic prejudice in sexual assault and homicide cases. In the current research, we made use
of prior findings on generic prejudice with community jury samples
(Vidmar, 1997) and experimental findings relying on student samples (Wiener et al., 2006). Vidmar (1997) defines generic prejudice as
‘‘general attitudes, beliefs, and biases held by the juror that prevents
her or him from deciding the case with a fair and impartial mind’’ (p.
6). Generic prejudice arises from individual differences that jurors
hold about the ‘‘nature of the crime or the type of parties involved
[which] cause the juror to classify the case as having certain characteristics, thereby invoking stereotyped prejudices about any defendant
accused of the crime’’ (Vidmar, 1997, p. 6; see also Vidmar, 2002). In

K e l l e r & W e i n e r i n B e h av i o r a l S c i e n c e s a n d t h e L aw 2 9 ( 2 0 1 1 )

7

a field study of Canadian courts, Vidmar (1997) reported an average
of 36% of venire members biased during voir dire in 25 trials (849
potential jurors) in which male defendants faced charges of sexually
assaulting male and female complainants, who ranged from 5 to 23
years old (Vidmar, 1997). In these cases, had the courts seated these
jurors it is likely they would have applied a heuristic, which holds that
male defendants charged with sexual crimes are likely guilty. Vidmar
(2002) argued that pretrial publicity interjected into litigation through
the written and electronic media’s coverage of criminal proceedings
is one, but not the only, trigger of generic prejudice. He favored peremptory challenges to remove jurors who show signs of generic prejudice and who would apply prejudicial heuristics.
In a follow-up study in our laboratory (Wiener et al., 2006), we
presented 10 homicide and 10 sexual assault scenarios to undergraduate mock jurors, for whom some of the scenarios were matched by
charge and others were matched by fact similarity. We used regression analysis to study consistencies in verdicts as a function of specific charge, type of case (sexual assault vs. homicide), and fact similarities among cases and found that undergraduates judged the same
charge types with different facts more consistently than they should
by chance alone (generic prejudice). This was truer for the sexual assault cases than for the homicide cases. One interpretation of these
findings is that undergraduates hold attitudes about sexual assault
that influence their judgments of culpability beyond the facts of the
case, as they understand them. In other words, the results of Wiener
et al. (2006) were consistent with an untested interaction between
type of sample and type of charge, which would suggest that specific
attitudes may very well influence the judgments that different samples
of mock jurors make about sexual assault cases even when the cases
show little in the way of fact similarities. In the current research, we
tested this interaction using a similar set of sexual assault and homicide cases to look more systematically for interactions between explicit attitudes as measured with several scales that other researchers have used successfully in the recent past. These were the Attitudes
toward Rape (ATR) scale (Kovera, 2002), the Attitudes toward Sexual
Abuse (ATSA) scale (Briere, Hehschel, & Smiljanich, 1992), and the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) (Kassin and Wrightsman, 1983).
In this manner, we applied our prior generic prejudice work to
the current concern with interactions between construct and external
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validity factors. We predicted that sample type (student vs. community
mock jurors) would moderate the associations between these explicitly measured attitudes and mock juror evaluations of sexual assault
culpability, and that the type of charges that the mock jurors evaluated would further qualify those associations. Because Wiener et al.
(2006) found more evidence of generic bias in sexual assault cases
than in homicide cases, we expected fewer, if any, interactions between explicit attitude measures toward homicide and type of sample
in the 10 homicide cases from Wiener et al. (2006). To test that prediction, we administered an Attitude Toward Homicide Scale (ATHA),
which we created for use in this experiment, along with the existing
ATR, ATSA, and JBS, and calculated associations between those explicit measures and mock juror judgments of culpability for the sexual assault and homicide scenarios.
The current paper adds to the previous work the expectation that
sexual assault charges and homicide charges may invoke different
types of attitudes in students and community members as a function of both groups’ sophistication with the social world. Put simply, we suspect that adult community members, many of whom have
children of their own, likely hold different attitudes about sexual assault and apply them somewhat differently than do college students,
who probably look at sexuality with much more ambiguity than do
their grandparents, parents, uncles, and aunts. Because sexual assault
involves behavior that is normally valued (i.e., consensual relations
among adults) but sometimes not (i.e., forced or unwanted relations),
charges in this area of criminal law require complicated value judgments and, as such, are more likely to result in generic prejudice. We
expected that college students’ decisions would show the ambiguity
in their judgments about sexual behavior and therefore be more influenced by their attitudes about sexual conduct (and misconduct) than
would those in a community sample. We did not expect these same
types of effects for homicide. Because there is less room for interpretation in cases of homicide, we expected simple leniency effects in
homicide cases as previously found in the jury decision-making literature, where college students are, overall, more lenient than community samples (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Schuller & Hastings, 1996; Simon & Mahan, 1971).
In summary, the problem with simple comparisons between students and nonstudents that do not take each sample’s attitudes and
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prior beliefs into consideration is that these studies oversimplify a
complex social and psychological reality. If different types of jurors
respond differently in an understandable manner to specific aspects
of law and legal process with regard to violent crime, then it is incumbent upon researchers to look for other systematic differences in
other areas. Other interactions between external validity issues (i.e.,
type of sample) and construct validity issues (i.e., effects of admonishments, burdens of proof, standards of proof, establishment of negligence, exculpatory clauses, and so on) may also be lurking beneath
the surface of our research literature.

Method
Participants
This study included one sample of 120 undergraduates (55 males and
65 females, mean age = 20 years) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln who participated in return for course credit. The sample comprised 81% Caucasian, 5% African-American, 5% Asian-American, and
9% other students. A second sample of 99 community members (49
males and 50 females, mean age = 42 years) responded to advertisements in local newspapers and completed the experiment for a $30
stipend. Again, the majority of participants were Caucasian (85%).
African-American participants comprised 6% of the sample and the
remainder categorized themselves as ‘‘other’’ (9%). Prior to participation in the experiment, researchers screened community members
to ensure juror eligibility. Each individual who answered a newspaper ad by leaving their name and number on our laboratory phone
was required either to be a registered voter in the state of Nebraska
or to hold a valid Nebraska driver’s license, be free from felony convictions that stripped civil rights, and be at least 19 years of age, the
age of majority in Nebraska.1 In this manner, we selected a jury-eligible community sample to compare against a sample of undergraduate students who were part of the typical university subject pool.
1. One community member feigned answers to these questions, as discovered in the demographics questionnaire, and was excluded from the analysis, resulting in a sample of 99
community members.
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There was no deception in this experiment. The researchers simply
explained to the participants that they would be reading and evaluating case scenarios and completing questionnaires about the culpability of the actors in a series of allegations.

Materials and Procedure
Similar to Wiener et al.’s (2006) method, participants evaluated 20
crime fact patterns or case scenarios that we loosely based on 10 homicide and 10 sex crime trials appearing as appellate cases in New
York State case reporters. Participants evaluated two exemplars for
each of five sexual assault charges (i.e., attempted sexual assault in
the first degree, attempted sexual assault in the third degree, sexual
assault against a minor, sexual assault in first degree, and sexual assault in the second degree) and two for each of five homicide charges
(i.e., first-degree murder, second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, second-degree attempted murder, and motor vehicle homicide).2 Each written scenario summarized the case facts, altering the
arguments to create fact patterns that were neither weak nor strong,
as established in prior pilot testing.
Each scenario began by naming the defendant and victim and then
went on to present the facts of the case. The details consisted of testimony of the defendant, victim, and any available testimony from
expert and lay witnesses. The scenarios concluded with a short definition of the charge, which gave the elements of the law, burden of
proof, and standard of proof. The elements of the law for each scenario came from statutory language in the Nebraska Penal Code. All
scenarios were approximately one page in length.
After reading each scenario, participants evaluated the culpability
of the defendant against four indices, three of which presented evaluation ratings on nine-point Likert type scales: (i) the likelihood of the
defendant’s guilt (1, very unlikely, to 9, very likely); (ii) convincingness
of the state’s evidence (1, not at all convincing, to 9, very convincing);
and (iii) convincingness of the defendant’s evidence (same convincingness scale). Also included was a ‘‘mens rea’’ question, which followed
2. Copies of all scenarios may be obtained from the second author, Dr Richard Wiener, by
email at rwiener2@unl.edu
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Table 1. Statistics for guilt judgments
Charge
Attempted sexual assault in the first degree
Attempted sexual assault in the third degree
Sexual assault of a Minor
Sexual assault in the first degree
Sexual assault in the second degree
Murder in the second degree
Murder in the first degree
Manslaughter
Attempted murder in the second degree
Motor vehicle homicide

n

M(SD)

95% CI

218
218
217
218
217
219
219
219
219
219

5.85(1.54)
5.25(1.68)
5.32(1.55)
6.44(1.35)
5.51(1.51)
6.22(1.35)
6.74(1.36)
5.84(1.65)
5.52(1.59)
5.48(1.70)

[5.64, 6.05]
[5.03, 5.48]
[5.11, 5.52]
[6.26, 6.62]
[5.31, 5.71]
[6.04, 6.40]
[6.56, 6.92]
[5.62, 6.06]
[5.31, 5.73]
[5.25, 5.71]

CI, confidence interval.

the Model Penal Code (1962; 1981) and asked respondents whether the
defendant acted with (1) no intention, (2) negligently, (3) recklessly,
(4) knowingly or (5) purposefully. Participants read and evaluated
each scenario in the order in which they appeared. We tested the calibration of the scenarios by calculating the means and standard deviations for each pair of scenarios with the same charges on the likelihood of guilt scale, the midpoint of which was 5.00. Table 1 lists these
statistics along with the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the means.
Examination of these results reveals that guilt judgments were close to
the midpoint of the means (ranging between 5.25 and 6.74), and the
CIs (never including a value below 5.00 and never reaching 7.00). Table 1 shows that the furthest deviations for the midpoints of the scales
were for murder in the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree, which tend to produce slightly higher ratings (more likelihood
of guilt) than the other charges. Thus, the judgments on the scenarios, although slightly biased against the defendants, showed enough
variability to allow for meaningful analyses of culpability.
Following the 20 case scenarios and their evaluations, participants
completed several explicit measures of adjudicative bias that measure trait-like qualities. The researchers presented these stable attitude measures after the case scenarios so that they would not inform
the participants that the true purpose of the experiment was to examine differential relationships between attitudes toward different
types of crimes and culpability evaluations. Three of the four measures were published scales with established and stable reliabilities:
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the ATR scale (α = 0.87), the ATSA scale (α = 0.72) and the Juror Bias
Scale (α = 0.83). We also included the ATHA that we created for the
purposes of this experiment.
The ATR is a 27-item questionnaire that measures responsibility
and blame for sexual assault crimes. Examples of questions include,
‘‘In most cases when a woman was raped, she was asking for it’’ and
‘‘In order to protect the male, it should be difficult to prove that a rape
has occurred’’ (1, strongly agree, to 7, strongly disagree). The ATSA
measures culpability in sexual assault cases with child victims across
15 items such as, ‘‘Children sometimes say they have been molested
to get attention, or to get back at someone’’ and ‘‘Children sometimes
try to seduce adults’’ (1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree). The
JBS is a 22-item scale that measures jurors’ pretrial attitudes by tapping into their opinions about the legal structure and about those who
are key players in the system, such as judges, the police, and defendants. While it includes two, and sometimes three, scales, this study
used a global measure of bias against the defense with questions such
as, ‘‘Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of
pure sympathy’’ and ‘‘Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least
75 are guilty of the crime with which they are charged’’ (1, strongly
agree, to 5, strongly disagree).
The ATHA contains seven items that we developed to measure attitudes about homicide charges on which participants rated their agreement on scales ranging from 1 (agree) to 5 (disagree). The items were
as follows: (i) defendants charged with homicide are very likely to be
guilty; (ii) when police arrest someone for killing another, they only do
so if they are sure the killer is guilty; (iii) too often people serve long
sentences for homicide when they are not guilty; (iv) people who kill
others while driving drunk should not be judged as harshly as those
who kill for their own purposes; (v) manslaughter, murder, and attempted murder are all equally horrible crimes; (vi) people who try
to kill someone but fail at the last minute should be punished as severely as those who succeed in their efforts; (vii) the courts make too
much out of subtle differences in homicide cases, such as the difference between first- and second-degree murder. Coefficient alpha for
the scale was 0.62. These four explicit measures appeared in random
order separately determined for each participant.
To rule out the possibility that these scales were all measures of
the same or similar constructs, we calculated correlations between
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Table 2. Correlations between predictors
JBS
JBS
ATHA
ATSA
ATR

—
0.56***
0.10
0.28***

ATHA
—
—
–0.07
0.18*

ATSA
—
—
—
0.42***

ATR
—
—
—
—

ATHA, Attitude Toward Homicide Adjudication Scale; ATR, Attitudes toward Rape scale; ATSA,
Attitudes toward Sexual Abuse scale; JBS, Juror Bias Scale.
* p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.001

the scales and displayed them in Table 2. The highest correlation
among these predictors was 0.56, between the JBS and ATHA, indicating that respondents who generally favored the prosecution also
showed some bias against defendants in homicide cases. Furthermore,
the 0.42 correlation between the ATSA and ATR showed that respondents who thought children could be responsible for their own sexual assaults were also biased against complainants in rape cases. Despite these significant relationships (and two other lower ones that
included the ATR), the squared correlation coefficients in these data
show that, on average, the predictors shared only about 10% of the
variance and that the highest r2 was 0.31. Thus, while there were some
overall relationships between these variables, they were not measures
of the same constructs.
Finally, participants completed a standard demographic questionnaire. Students and community members worked independently
within a group setting of no more than 10 respondents to evaluate the
cases, complete the attitude measures, and fill out the demographic
survey. At no time did the researchers permit the participants to communicate about the materials.

Results
To simplify the analysis and focus on the examination of differences
between students and community members, we combined cases that
shared a charge, so that we had 10 pairs of cases, five pairs with homicide-based charges and five with sexual assault-based charges instead of 20 individual cases. For example, the analyses used the averages of the guilt ratings for both attempted sexual assault in the
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second-degree cases for each participant, to create a single attempted
sexual assault in the second-degree score. We did the same for state
convincingness, defense convincingness, and criminal intent.
Analyses of covariance measured main effects and interactions for
the type of participant (student or community member) separately
for the sexual assault and homicide cases. The dependent variables in
those cases were the guilt, state convincingness, defendant convincingness, and criminal intent ratings, and the between-subject independent variables were type of participant and participant gender. The
five case-specific charges within sexual assault cases and the five specific charges within homicide cases were repeated measures factors.
The continuous explicit attitude measures were covariates in the analyses reported below. In summary, we calculated 2 (participant type)
× 2 (gender) × 5 (charge) ANCOVAs with appropriate explicit attitude
scales as covariates and evaluated those models separately for the sexual assault cases and the homicide cases.
Sexual Assault
Guilt likelihood
Each ANCOVA model examined the relationship between the five sexual assault charges by participant type and gender with the appropriate explicit measures, ATSA, ATR, and JBS. We report only main effects
or interactions involving the type of participant for each of the four
indices of culpability. The analyses resulted in two interactions for the
sexual assault cases, demonstrating that the relationships between
the attitudes toward defendants overall (JBS), and attitudes toward
rape (ATR) were different depending upon the type of participant and
the type of charge. For guilt in sexual assault cases, there were interactions for type of participant by charge by JBS [F(4, 800) = 2.54, p
= 0.039, η2 = 0.013], and type of participant by charge by gender by
ATR [F(4, 800) = 2.90, p = 0.021, η2 = 0.014] Follow-up analysis for
the three-way JBS interaction showed that the JBS was a stronger predictor of guilt verdicts in sexual assault cases for community members [F(4, 364) = 3.73, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.039] than for students [F(4,
436) = 1.57, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.014]. Table 3 lists the beta weights and
significance levels for each type of charge.3 The JBS predicted guilty
3. Note that the beta values reported in this manuscript are all standardized.
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Table 3. Regression weights, sexual assault guilt and JBS by type of participant
Charge		

Beta weight

Students 		Community members
Attempted sexual assault in the first degree
Attempted sexual assault in the third degree
Sexual assault of a minor
Sexual assault in the first degree
Sexual assault in the second degree

0.076
–0.047
–0.13
–0.12
–0.13

–0.20a
–0.23*
–0.45***
–0.056
–0.079

a. p < 0.065 ; * p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.001

verdicts for attempted sexual assault in the first degree, attempted
sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault of a minor for
community members. Thus, community members who showed less
bias against defendants were the ones who were least likely to find
the defendants guilty of these three sexual assault charges. We found
no evidence of a relationship between bias and guilt ratings for the
sexual assault ratings in the student sample.
Follow-up analysis for the four-way interaction with the ATR revealed that, overall, the attitudes toward rape behaved just the opposite to overall jury bias because it was a better predictor of guilt likelihood in sexual assault cases for students [F(4, 436) = 2.59, p = 0.036,
η2 = 0.023] than for community members [F(4, 364) = 1.49, p = 0.21,
η2 = 0.016]. Making the results more complicated, there were differences among the types of cases in which the ATR was successful for
predicting judgments for men and women. Table 4 regression weights
showed significant effects for four of the five charge types. For male
students, the ATR was related to guilt verdicts for attempted sexual
assault in the first and third degrees and sexual assault in the second
degree, and predicted sexual assault of a minor and sexual assault in
the second degree for female students. Furthermore, the ATR was related to sexual assault guilt likelihood scores among female community members when they evaluated guilt in attempted sexual assault
in the third degree and sexual assault of a minor. Thus, for male students and women, regardless of community or student status, those
who scored higher on negative attitudes toward rape were more likely
to find the defendants guilty in one or more of the sexual assault cases.
Importantly, the relationship between the ATR and guilt verdicts failed
to reach significance for any of the five sexual assault charge types
among male community members.
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Table 4. Regression weights, sexual assault guilt and ATR by gender and type of
participant
Charge

Beta weight

Male
Female
students students
			

Male
Female
community community
members
members

Attempted sexual assault in the first degree
Attempted sexual assault in the third degree
Sexual assault of a minor
Sexual assault in the first degree
Sexual assault in the second degree

0.088
–0.082
0.099
0.15
0.037

0.40*
0.38*
0.053
0.24
0.31a

0.11
–0.052
0.33*
0.23
0.41**

0.15
0.38*
0.35*
0.022
0.21

ATR, Attitudes toward Rape scale.
a. p < 0.065 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01

Convincingness of state’s evidence
Assessments of state convincingness in sexual assault scenarios produced a significant interaction for type of participant by JBS [F(1, 199)
= 3.95, p = 0.048, η2 = 0.019]. Follow-up analyses showed that the
JBS was associated with the convincingness of the state’s arguments
in community members [F(1, 91) = 10.63, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.11], but
not in students [F(1, 108) = 2.22, p = 0.14, η2 = 0.02]. Simple correlations showed that those community members with less bias against
defendants were less likely to find the state’s evidence convincing (r
= –0.21, p = 0.042). The same relationship for students was not significant (r = –0.056, p = 0.54).4,5

4 There was a significant interaction among charge × type of participant × gender × ATSA
[F(4, 800) = 2.49, p = 0.042, η2 = 0.012]. However, follow-up analyses showed that only
a single correlation was driving this interaction. The ATSA was predictive of female student state convincingness evaluations for the attempted sexual assault in the first degree
cases only. We discuss this isolated effect no further.
5 The indicator of convincingness of the defendant’s evidence in sexual assault cases yielded a
significant interaction among type of participant, gender, and ATSA [F(1, 200) = 4.35, p =
0.038, η2 = 0.021]. However, follow-up regressions showed that the ATSA was not significantly related to defendant convincingness in any of the four groups (i.e., male or female
students or community members). There were no significant main effects or interactions
involving type of participant for criminal intent in the sexual assault cases.
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Homicide
We constructed ANCOVA models to examine the relationship between
the five homicide charges, again including type of participant and
gender as between-subject factors, and the non-sex-based explicit attitude measures, the ATHA and the JBS, as covariates. The ATR and
ATSA are largely irrelevant to homicide verdicts so we did not include
them in the statistical models. Again, we report only main effects or
interactions involving the type of participant for each of the four indices of guilt.
Guilt Likelihood
For guilt likelihood, we found a between-groups main effect for type
of participant [F(1, 205) = 4.40, p = 0.037, η2 = 0.021], which did not
involve charge as a moderator so that the effect occurred across all
five pairs of homicide cases. Students had a mean verdict of 5.88 (SD
= 0.82), while community members rated homicide guilt certainty
higher, at 6.06 (SD = 0.90). Consistent with the previous literature,
these results show that students were more lenient when assigning
guilt in homicide cases than were community members. The ANCOVAs also showed a significant interaction for type of participant ×
gender × charge × ATHA [F(4, 820) = 3.79, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.018].
Follow-up regressions showed that the ATHA was significantly associated with likelihood of guilt for only female students in one crime
category, namely, murder in the second degree ( β = –0.35, p<0.01).
For female students, but not other participants, decreased bias against
the defendants was associated with a lower likelihood of finding the
defendant guilty in the second-degree murder cases.
Convincingness of state’s evidence
The convincingness of the state’s evidence against the defendant provided one between groups interaction between type of participant and
the ATHA [F(1, 205) = 3.75, p = 0.054, η2 = 0.018]. Follow-up analysis revealed that the ATHA was a better predictor of state convincingness in homicide cases for students [F(1, 112) = 6.10, p = 0.015, η2 =
0.052] than for community members [F(1, 93) = 0.075, p = 0.79, η2 =
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Table 5. Regression weights, homicide defendant convincingness and JBS by gender and type of participant
Beta weight
Explicit
measure

Male
students

Female
students

Male community
members

Female community
members

–0.20

0.30*

–0.013

–0.16

JBS
JBS, Juror Bias Scale.
* p < 0.05

0.001]. The beta weights and significance levels in follow-up regressions for this interaction explain this finding. Student assessments
of state convincingness were significantly related to the ATHA ( β =
–0.26, p = 0.014), while community member assessments were not (
β = 0.024, p = 0.85). That is, for students, but not for community participants, decreased bias against the defendants was associated with a
lower likelihood of finding that the state had a more convincing case.
Convincingness of defendant’s evidence
There was also one between-groups interaction of type of participant
on defendant convincingness for homicide cases, a type × gender ×
JBS [F(1, 205) = 4.62, p = 0.033, η2 = 0.022]. Again, follow-up regression analyses revealed that the JBS was a better predictor of student
judgments of defendant convincingness [F(1, 112) = 6.15, p = 0.015, η2
= 0.052] than community member assessments [F(1, 93) = 0.42, p =
0.52, η2 = 0.005]. Analysis of Table 5, which provides the beta weights
and significance levels for each type and gender of participant, shows
that the JBS was predictive of defendant convincingness judgments for
only female students. Surprisingly, female students who were higher
in bias against defendants were more likely to find that the defense
has a convincing case. Perhaps they were searching for evidence to
offset their biases against the defense in order to be able to find the
defendants less likely to be guilty in the homicide cases.
Criminal intent
Intention of the defendant determinations produced two significant
interactions, type of participant × charge [F(4, 820) = 5.26, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.025] and type of participant × charge × JBS [F(4, 820) = 4.18,
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Table 6. Difference tests, homicide intention by type of participant
t (df)

Charge pair

Students
Community
		members
Murder in the second degree and
murder in the first degree
Meansa
Murder in the second degree and manslaughter
Means
Murder in the second degree and attempted
murder in the second degree
Means
Murder in the second degree and motor
vehicle homicide
Means
Murder in the first degree and manslaughter
Means
Murder in the first degree and attempted
murder in the second degree
Means
Murder in the first degree and motor vehicle homicide
Means
Manslaughter and attempted murder in the second degree
Means
Manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide
Means
Attempted murder in the second degree
and motor vehicle homicide
Means

6.96 (119)***

5.16 (98)***

4.11, 3.40
9.78 (119)***
4.11, 3.13
5.30 (119)***

4.06, 3.52
7.42 (98)***
4.06, 3.21
5.16 (98)***

4.11, 3.52
22.10 (119)***

4.06, 3.44
18.43 (98)***

4.11, 1.93
2.51 (119) *
3.40, 3.13
–1.00 (119)
3.40, 3.52
12.59 (119)***
3.40, 1.93
–3.51 (119)**
3.13, 3.52
13.46 (119)***
3.13, 1.93
12.64 (119)***
3.52, 1.93

4.06, 1.93
2.50 (98)*
3.52, 3.21
0.59 (98)
3.52, 3.44
12.96 (98)***
3.52, 1.93
–1.73 (98)
3.21, 3.44
11.71 (98)***
3.21, 1.93
11.06 (98)***
3.44, 1.93

* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p<0.001
a. Means in each row for each column are intention means for the student or community samples for
the different cases in the first column.

p = 0.002, η2 = 0.020]. Follow-up ANOVAs for the type of participant
× charge interaction showed that there were differences in the intention verdicts for the five charges of homicide cases for both students
[F(4, 448) = 9.14, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.075] and community members
[F(4, 372) = 2.40, p = 0.050, η2 = 0.025]. Table 6 presents the 10 pairs
of different charges that we listed by comparing each of the five homicide charges with each of the other homicide charges. It displays
t-tests and significance levels for each pair. The results show that,
for students, the only pair of cases that were not significantly different on intention assessments comprised murder in the first degree
and attempted murder in the second degree. This pair of charges was
also not significantly different for community members. However, for
students there was an additional pair, manslaughter and attempted
murder in the second degree, which was not significantly different in
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intention ratings. The t-values show that for some of the pairs, the
differences between the means of the students’ ratings are more separated than were the community sample ratings.
Inspection of the means of the intention ratings for each charge revealed that students and community members ranked the cases on intention in a similar, but not the same, manner.
For all pairs, except for first-degree murder and attempted seconddegree murder, both the students and the community members perceived criminal intention differences in the charges, but not always
finding greater levels of criminal intent in the more serious charges
(see, e.g., murder in the second degree, murder in the first degree, and
manslaughter). Cases sharing a charge of murder in the second degree
had the highest intention ranking, with means that corresponded to a
mens rea rating of slightly above knowing. For students, manslaughter
had the next highest ranking, followed closely by murder in the first
degree, with a ranking between reckless and knowing. Community
members rated murder in the first degree as slightly higher than attempted murder in the second degree. Both samples rated manslaughter as slightly above reckless. Finally, defendants facing a charge of
motor vehicle homicide were assigned the lowest intention, slightly
below negligence. Regardless of the direction of the differences in
rated criminal intent, in all comparisons but one (manslaughter and
attempted murder in the second degree), the students’ level of perceived intent was similar to that of the community sample. Therefore,
whatever drove the leniency effect in students on guilt likelihood ratings was very likely not a difference in perceptions of criminal intent.
The follow-up analysis for the type of participant × charge × JBS
interaction demonstrated that the JBS was a better predictor of intention verdicts in homicide cases for students [F(4, 448) = 5.21, p =
0.001, η2 = 0.044] than for community members [F(4, 372) = 0.76,
p = 0.55, η2 = 0.008]. The results of follow-up regression analyses
showed that for one type of charge, attempted murder in the second
degree, the JBS was associated with lower levels of inferred criminal
intent. Thus students, but not community members, who showed less
bias against defendants were likely to find lower levels of criminal intent ( β = –0.21, p < 0.05).
See Table 7 for a complete summary of the significant main effects and interactions involving type of sample in the sexual assault
and homicide cases.
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Table 7. Summary of findings
Community sample

Students

Sexual assault cases
Guilt certainty
The JBS was a significant predictor of
No effect for JBS
certainty in sexual assault guilty verdicts
The ATR was a significant predictor of
guilt certainty for some sexual assault
cases for female community members
but not for males

The ATR was a significant predictor of
guilt certainty for some sexual assault
cases for male students and other
cases for female students

State convincingness
The JBS was a significant predictor of how
convincing the state’s case was in sexual
assault cases for community members

Guilt certainty
Community members more likely to be
certain of guilty verdicts
No effect for ATHA
State convincingness
No effect for this group

Defense convincingness
No effect for this group

Intention
No effect for this group

No effect for this group

Homicide cases
The student sample was more likely
to be certain of not guilty verdicts
ATHA was a significant predictor of guilt
certainty for female students
The ATHA was a significant predictor of 		
how convincing the state’s case was in 		
homicide cases for students

The JBS was a significant predictor of 		
how convincing the defense’s case was 		
for female student ratings of defense 		
convincingness in homicide cases
The JBS was a significant predictor of 		
level of intention for attempted murder 		
in the second degree for students

ATHA, Attitude Toward Homicide Adjudication Scale; ATR, Attitudes toward Rape scale; ATSA, Attitudes
toward Sexual Abuse scale; JBS, Juror Bias Scale.

Discussion
Sexual assault
Based upon our prior work in generic prejudice (Wiener et al., 2006),
we predicted that the most meaningful interactions between type of
participant attitudes and guilt ratings would emerge in sexual assault cases. Indeed, our results showed that the relationships between
the attitudes toward defendants overall (JBS) and toward rape (ATR)
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showed very different associations with sexual assault guilt judgments
depending upon the type of participant and the type of charge. Specifically, community members who showed less bias against defendants
were the ones who were least likely to find the defendants guilty of
these sexual assault charges. Community members’ explicit attitudes
played a significant role in their verdicts. Importantly, we found no evidence of a relationship between bias and guilt ratings for the sexual
assault judgments in our student sample. The results for the relationship between the JBS and the convincingness of the state’s evidence
were similar in that those community members with less bias against
defendants were less likely to find the state’s evidence convincing.
However, a different pattern emerged for the ATR measure, which
was related to guilt for women mock jurors, regardless of community or student status. Those women who scored higher on negative
attitudes toward rape were more likely to find the defendants guilty
in one or more of the sexual assault cases. Importantly, the relationship between the ATR and guilt verdicts failed to reach significance
for any of the five sexual assault charge types among male community members. In short, the overall adjudication bias in community
members only was related to guilt ratings in the sexual assault cases,
while attitudes toward rape were associated with guilt ratings in all
samples except male community members. At the same time, the interaction between type of participant and the JBS provided additional
evidence of the complexity of attitudes in different populations. Specifically, community members with less bias against defendants were
less likely to find the state’s evidence convincing, but this was not true
for the student sample.
While there is no identifiable theory that explains the differential responses that students and community members made to these
sexual assault cases, it would be very useful to conduct research that
could explain these interactions. We cannot determine from these
data whether the differences in processing style are the result of
variation in experience, motivation, emotion, or other psychological mechanisms. However, one reasonable explanation might be that
students are accustomed to systematically processing information
looking for arguments and counter-arguments that support specific
verdicts, while community members who are not currently engaged
in academic pursuits seek heuristic evidence that is consistent with
their preexisting attitudes and biases. Future research to pinpoint the
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psychological mechanisms that underlie these effects has the potential to do more than warn against overgeneralization. The conclusions
reached in such work would help researchers to determine when it is
best to rely on community residents as participants in mock jury research and when it is sufficient to present materials to undergraduate research participants. Even though we are not in a position to explain with theory the differences that we found, we can conclude that
if the goal of the mock jury research is to model accurately the type
of decisions that jurors reach and the processes by which they reach
them, mock jury studies of sexual assault ought to take seriously the
sample composition.
Homicide
Based upon our previous work in generic prejudice (Wiener et al.,
2006), we predicted that the interactions emerging between participant attitudes and guilt ratings would paint a less clear picture in
the homicide cases, and, indeed, the major story here seems to be the
main effect of type of participant. Across all five charges within the
homicide block of cases, students rated the likelihood of guilt lower
than did community members. Helping to explain these results was
an interaction between our ATHA scale and type of participant, such
that the students but not community members were sensitive to their
own attitudes toward this type of adjudication when rating the convincingness of the state’s evidence. For students, but not for community participants, decreased bias against the defendants was associated with a lower likelihood of finding that the state had a more
convincing case. Community members were less discriminating when
evaluating the state’s case, which may explain why they were more
willing to rate the defendants guilty. Surprisingly, differences in the
guilt ratings were likely not attributable to the differences in perceptions of criminal intent. While there were some slight differences
in the way students and community members analyzed intent, overall they did so similarly, even showing comparable errors in thinking about intent in the homicide charges. Overall, we conclude that
mock jury studies of homicide ought to consider the sample composition if researchers are to describe accurately the role of overall adjudication bias and make accurate predictions of when jurors will
find defendants guilty.
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Interactions of External Validity and Construct Validity
Our comparison of the manner in which undergraduate participants
and community participants think about sexual assault and homicide
cases shows that for some cases (here sexual assault cases) external
validity factors, such as type of participant and attitude factors, interact with construct validity factors, such as the specific charges. Using
some well established explicit measures, the ATR scale, the ATSA scale,
and the JBS, and a new measure created for this study, the ATHA, we
showed clear differences in the associations between attitudes and
case outcomes for students and community members. For some cases
with sexual assault charges, the associations were the same for both
samples, but for other cases, the way in which the mock jurors invoked
their own attitudes was very different according to gender and community status. Furthermore, while we found some limited interactions
between the JBS and the ATHA with type of participant for the homicide cases, the major finding was that there was a main effect across
all charges, such that the students were more lenient in their judgments than were community-eligible jurors. Furthermore, that difference was not explainable by judgments of criminal intent but instead
by overall leniency that influenced all of the homicide charges in the
same way. Here the chief limiting factor is simply the main effect of
one external validity factor, type of respondent.
Cook and Campbell (1979) provided us with a convenient and powerful way to think about the ability of our research results to generalize beyond the immediate data that we collect. Our work suggests
that it is time for jury researchers to take seriously the issues of external validity and especially the way it may limit construct validity
in jury studies. In this work, had we relied only on a sample of undergraduates, we would have found very different attitude relationships
and guilt likelihood effects in both kinds of cases. Perhaps more importantly, we would have missed entirely the fine distinctions in the
way in which mock jurors evaluate these types of cases and we would
have been unable to retrieve those subtleties.
The use of undergraduate mock jurors is efficient and in many
cases very suitable for the initial tests of important issues, even issues
with some practical significance. For example, Rose and Ogloff (2001)
showed that researchers could make extensive use of undergraduate
participants to test the comprehensibility of jury instructions, pointing
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out areas where they need improvement and areas in which people
understand the plain meaning of the instructions. However, given
the kinds of findings that we show here (leniency effects with undergraduates and more impact of jury bias), it might still be necessary to
verify the final results of such testing with jury-eligible respondents.
Other work that adds to the veracity of the student findings includes
Wiener et al. (2004), who documented high levels of miscomprehension in a community sample of mock jurors. The poor comprehension in a community sample may have been better in a sample of undergraduate college students who were more familiar with mastering
new and complex information and taking tests to measure comprehension. Our main point is that when there is some expectation that
behavior will not be identical from sample to sample, jury researchers can only be sure of the generalizability of their findings when they
compare results from different samples. Based on our work (Wiener
et al., 2006) and Vidmar’s (1997, 2002) work in generic prejudice we
expected that students and community members would show different patterns of judgments across a sample of sexual assault and homicide cases and, in fact, they did. We suspect there are many other
areas in which sample characteristics are important.
Vidmar (2008) commented that the most important structures to
study in jury research are the effects of the judge’s preliminary comments, the attorneys’ opening statements, the direct and cross-examinations of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys, the actual testimony
of the witnesses, the testimony of experts, attorneys’ closing arguments, and jury instructions. Each of these important structural issues could influence the substantive judgments that are the products
of both civil and criminal trials. Vidmar (2008) complains, justifiably,
that jury simulation studies often fail to examine the relationship between the structural elements of trials and the judgment outcomes.
We argue that relying only on the results of studies that use undergraduate students as mock jurors compounds this problem because
students and eligible jurors may view charges, trial process, and trial
procedure from some very different perspectives. At the very least,
jury researchers should apply different theoretical models to study
multiple sample testing for convergence of findings across populations before they place too much confidence in findings with undergraduate mock jurors.
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Limitations
It is ironic that the major limitations in our study concern the construct validity of our methods. We did not use real trial procedures,
jurors did not deliberate, and the consequences of judgments were
very different for our mock jurors than they would be for jurors in real
cases. Furthermore, the participants in this research, primarily White
Europeans living in the Midwest, analyzed case scenarios rather than
more realistic trial evidence. However, like so many others before us,
we argue that our results are still important to consider in the context of mock jury trials and, as Bornstein (1999) has argued so effectively, simulations like our own can and do make important contributions to the literature. Furthermore, our work examined empirically
a potential limitation to the generalizability of mock jury findings,
type of participant, and we have shown that jury researchers ought
to consider the samples that they collect in the context of the types
of charges, burdens of proof, standards of evidence, and other procedures that make up the trials we study.
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